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What Probability Probably Isn't1 
 
Abstract 
Joyce and others have claimed that degrees of belief are estimates of truth-values and that the 
probability axioms are conditions of admissibility for these estimates with respect to a scoring rule 
penalising inaccuracy. In this paper I argue that the claim that the rules of probability are truth-directed 
in this way depends on an assumption which is both implausible and lacks any supporting evidence, 
strongly suggesting that the probability axioms have nothing intrinsically to do with truth-directedness. 
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1 Introduction 
A question much discussed, possibly over-discussed, in the annals of philosophical probability is why a 
rationally-constrained numerical measure of belief should obey the laws of (at least finitely additive) 
probability. Several answers have been offered, but each of these at some point seems to beg questions. 
Probably the best-known and certainly the simplest, based on the so-called Dutch Book argument, begs 
at least two: why an agent will accept either side of a bet at their true degree of belief, even at 'small' 
stakes, and why they will accept a finite sum of bets (one needs to assume only two) at their 
corresponding degrees of belief. To some extent these questions are answered by appealing to a more 
general, and certainly more complex, theory of utility, but that strategy raises further questions which 
are well-known and which it is not necessary to go into here.  
Joyce (1998, 2009) takes a radically different approach, one grounded on what he claims to be an 
objective epistemological criterion that he calls the Norm of Truth: 
An epistemically rational agent must strive to hold a system of full beliefs that strikes the best 
attainable overall balance between the epistemic good of fully believing truths and the 
epistemic evil of fully believing falsehoods (where fully believing a truth is better than having no 
opinion about it, and having no opinion about a falsehood is better than fully believing it). (1998, 
p.577) 
Joyce's theory has aroused a great deal of interest and indeed inaugurated a whole programme of 
research which still flourishes. Since his work is well-known I shall confine myself to a very brief 
description of it, and then say why I disagree with both its main thrust and its conclusions.  
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2 Gradational Accuracy 
 
Joyce's theory has two main components. One, which he calls 'the Alethic Principle', is the interpretation 
of 'an epistemically rational' agent's degree of belief in a proposition A as their best estimate of the 
truth-value of A (2009, p.269). Since a truth-value isn't obviously a number, some numerical coding is 
required to give workable content to the Principle, and Joyce follows an established convention in 
coding the truth-values of propositions by their indicator functions, where for any proposition A the 
indicator function, sometimes also called the characteristic function, IA(w) of A is equal to 1 if state w 
makes A true and equal to 0 if not. Given that coding, something like a formal version of the Alethic 
Principle seems to be embedded in mathematical probability theory (as a consequence of the additivity 
of probability functions), by virtue of the fact that the probability of A is equal to the expected value of 
IA, though clearly this fact can't without circularity be used in support of the Principle if the latter itself is 
enlisted, as it is in Joyce's theory, in support of an argument for the probability axioms themselves. I 
shall come back to this point later. 
 
The second component of Joyce's theory is a demonstration that the rules of probability are what 
decision-theorists call a condition of admissibility, or non-dominance, relative to a measure of the 
inaccuracy of these estimates: hence 
Since epistemically rational agents must strive to hold accurate beliefs, this establishes 
conformity with the axioms of probability as a norm of epistemic rationality whatever its 
prudential merits or defects might be (Joyce 1998, p.575).  
What is a measure of inaccuracy? Formally Joyce takes it to be a non-negative real-valued function of 
belief functions crossed with distributions of truth-values over their arguments (propositions from a 
Boolean algebra), and he shows that if certain conditions are imposed on it (dominance, continuity, 
normality, extensionality, convexity and symmetry) then any belief function not satisfying the 
probability axioms is dominated by one that does.   
The precise details of Joyce's argument will be less my concern here than his programme of justifying 
the probability axioms in terms of admissibility with respect to truth-accuracy, central to which, it will 
turn out, is the Alethic Principle. I will argue that this alleged principle lacks any adequate supporting 
argument, is indeed arguably false, and that without it the programme collapses. First, however, I will 
show that despite its apparent novelty, Joyce's argument is already implicit in some seminal work of the 
eminent probabilist Bruno de Finetti. 
.  
 
3 de Finetti's quadratic scoring rule 
In his (1974) de Finetti described a scenario for evaluating the closeness of an agent's estimates 
('previsions' in his terminology) of the values of a finite sequence of random quantities X1, ... , Xn to their 
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actual observed values. In this scenario, if the estimates are q1, .. ,qn and the true values (in the given 
state) are x1, ... ,xn, the agent suffers a penalty equal to i [(xi  – qi)/ki]
2, where the ki are decided in 
advance and are dimensionally homogeneous with the Xi (so the penalty is a pure number). De Finetti 
called the estimates qi 'coherent' just in case the penalty cannot be reduced across the set of all possible 
states by choosing any other sequence q'i
 : i.e., the original choice is admissible2. If the Xi are the 
indicator functions of n propositions Ai, as will be assumed in what follows, the penalising rule, often 
called a scoring rule, is proper in the sense that the expected value of the penalty is uniquely minimised 
when the qi are equal to the agent's corresponding degrees of belief in the Ai . If, as de Finetti did and 
Joyce does, we code truth-values by indicator functions, and any proper scoring rule is used, we obtain 
in effect Joyce's Alethic Principle: it is in the agent's interest to set their degrees of belief in the Ai equal 
to their estimates of the corresponding truth-values.  
De Finetti points out that his quadratic penalty is the square of the distance between vectors x and q in 
the linear space Rn endowed with the metric (xi/ki)
2 (1974, p.90), yielding the Euclidean metric when 
the ki are all equal to unity; the corresponding penalty is the so-called Brier score (xi-qi)
2. De Finetti 
then proceeded to show, by a simple geometric argument, that a necessary and sufficient condition for 
an agent's estimates to be coherent is that they satisfy the finitely additive probability axioms (ibid.). For 
example, suppose n=3, that the Ai are a partition and the penalty is the Brier score. The Ai can then be 
represented as the three points (1,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,0,1) at unit distance from the origin in 3-dimensional 
Euclidean space. The simplex (in this case plane triangle) whose vertices are these three points is their 
convex hull, i.e. the set of all convex combinations of the extreme points and hence the set of triples 
(p1,p2,p3) such that p1+p2+p3 = 1, pi 0. Now suppose P* is any point outside the simplex. Its projection 
onto the simplex clearly has a shorter distance to each of the vertices than that from P*. Notice that 
while any probabilistically incoherent estimate is dominated by a probabilistically coherent one, no 
probabilistically coherent estimate will dominate any other.  
Joyce discusses de Finetti 's theory, but rejects it because according to him (Joyce) it justifies 
probabilistic coherence on purely prudential grounds, lacking, Joyce claims, any epistemic rationale – 
the sort of rationale that he believes is afforded by his inaccuracy-theoretic account (1998, pp.584-585). 
However, the objection seems to have overlooked the fact that, despite de Finetti's drawing attention to 
it and indeed exploiting it, the additive quadratic scoring rule is both a penalty and a distance in a finite-
dimensional linear space.  In its second guise, it seems to perform the function Joyce demands of a 
cognitively adequate justification of the probability axioms: given the coding of truth-values by indicator 
functions, a probabilistically coherent forecast cannot be dominated in terms of an overall reduction in 
distance from the truth by any incoherent one3; indeed, in a section of his (2009) headed 'In praise of 
                                                          
2
 de Finetti gave two formal characterisations of coherence in (1974) and proved their equivalence. One is that 
described above; the other relates to an agent forced to give odds on a set of propositions when the stakes and 
the directions of the bets are set by an opponent: coherence in this sense means that no finite sum of such bets 
will yield a positive gain or loss. Since then the word 'coherent' has largely come to mean 'consistent with the 
probability calculus'. This last I will call 'probabilistic coherence'. 
3
 After de Finetti published his result the question was raised to what extent it depended on the precise form of his 
scoring rule. Several generalisations have since been proved, among them Joyce's, culminating in the paper by 
Predd et al. (2009) who, in an analogue of de Finetti's geometrical argument but based on a distance function 
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the Brier rule' Joyce commends it precisely on the ground that it represents what he calls 'pure accuracy' 
(p.293)4.  
 
4 The Catch 
The finitely additive probability axioms therefore seem to be demonstrable conditions of admissibility 
for the 'pure' truth-inaccuracy measured by the Brier rule (and any proportional to it like its arithmetical 
average, also often referred to simply as 'the Brier rule'). Perhaps surprisingly, that conclusion does not 
follow. It does not follow, because the indicator function IA(w) for A is just one method of coding 
numerically the truth-value of A in state w (though any other in which the number representing 'true' is 
greater than that representing 'false' is inessentially different, and there is another coding, no less 
faithful, for which the conclusion is false.  
That other coding is the complementary function CA = 1-IA. Despite certain practical advantages, the 
choice of IA is of course merely conventional, as Joyce himself concedes, and some systems of multi-
valued logic do in fact choose CA. So suppose we do so also in the present context. The coordinates of 
the Ai in the CA coding are (0,1,1), (1,0,1), (1,1,0).  The convex hull K' of these points lies in a plane 
parallel to that of the convex hull K of the Ai in the old system. K is the set of all points (p1, p2, p3), pi  0, 
pi = 1, and K' is the set of all points (p'1,p'2,p'3) where p'i = 1-pi. It follows that every probability 
distribution over the algebra generated by the Ai is dominated in terms of distance from the truth by 
some forecast in K', namely the projection of that probability distribution onto K'.  The identification of 
probabilistic coherence with gradational accuracy thus appears to be broken under this coding. Indeed, 
where P is a probability function, it is the forecast f(Ai) = 1-P(Ai) of the 'truth-value' of Ai which cannot be 
uniformly improved on. True, Joyce actually identifies a proposition A with IA (2009, p.268), but this 
simply pre-empts and does not answer a potential charge of arbitrariness.5  
It is true that the penalty (CA(w)-f)
2 for estimate f is not proper: its expected value for the belief 
distribution P(A) = P(A is true) = P(CA=0) = p, P(~A) = P(CA=1) = 1-p is minimised at f = 1-p, not p. This 
means that your forecast of the value of the truth-value of A (under the CA coding) records your degree 
of belief in the falsity of A. Joyce's response is to invert the statement above into the claim that the 
coding 'true' = 0, 1 = 'false' implies the adoption of a belief function b such that b(A) has the formal 
properties of P(~A): setting the code of the truth-value of a contradiction greater than that of a logical 
truth, he tells us,  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
called Bregman divergence, show that relative to any continuous proper scoring rule (de Finetti's rule is 
continuous), if a forecast f is probabilistically coherent then it is not weakly dominated by any forecast, and if f is 
probabilistically incoherent then it is strongly dominated by some probabilistically coherent forecast (ibid., 
Theorem 1). I strongly suspect, however, that de Finetti's seeming lack of interest in generalising his result to a 
wider class of penalty functions was because of the direct geometrical significance he gave to the quadratic 
penalty. 
4
 Though in (2009) he deems a single norm of accuracy 'unduly restrictive' (p.264), favouring a broader constraint 
of 'epistemic utility'. 
5
 Leitgeb and Pettigrew's development (op. cit.) of Joyce's ideas is also based on determining inaccuracy in terms of 
distance in Euclidean n-space from the points (1, 0, 0, ...), (0,1, 0, ...), ... representing n propositions A1, A2, ... 
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requires us to interpret larger b-values as signaling less confidence in the truth of a proposition 
and more in confidence in its falsehood.' (2009, p.268, footnote 7)  
This seems on the face of it a very strange claim: why should the choice of a conventional coding of 
truth-values tell us anything about the properties of a belief function?6 Joyce himself lists as basic 
properties of a belief function that it sets the degree of belief in the impossible proposition at a value 
strictly less than that of the certain proposition, and the degrees of belief in these two propositions are 
the endpoints of the interval in which belief is measured7 (and he also adds finite additivity). But none of 
these properties appears to depend on the way truth-values are coded. The mystery is compounded by 
Joyce's remark, in this same context, that 'If one mistakenly tries to retain the idea that b measures 
confidence in truths while setting b(~T) > b(T), one ends ups with nonsense' (2009, p.264, footnote 2; T 
is the logical truth in an algebra of propositions).  But that is so obviously true that one might well 
wonder why Joyce bothers to mention it.8 
The mystery is dispelled by recalling that Joyce includes the Alethic Principle among the basic properties 
of belief functions of 'epistemically rational agents'. As best estimates of truth-values (according to the 
Principle), these belief functions must reflect the latter's ordering under whatever numerical coding is 
chosen. Since belief functions must also 'measure confidence in truths' they must satisfy the condition 
b(~T) < b(T). Thus the CA coding is ruled out and IA is uniquely determined once the end-points of b's 
scale are fixed at 0 and 1. So everything depends on accepting the Alethic Principle in addition to pretty 
well universally accepted properties of belief functions. The only possible justification for doing so, 
however, would seem to be that the Principle is somehow implicit in the requirement of 'epistemic 
rationality'. But even if the aim of the epistemically rational agent is truth, it hardly follows that their 
degrees of belief should be interpreted as best estimates of numerically-coded truth-values. To claim 
otherwise seems only to conflate 'degree of belief in A's truth' with 'best estimate of A's truth-value', 
and I see no reason to suppose that these should necessarily be identical. On the contrary, if I choose to 
represent A's truth-value by CA then clearly the identity fails and one can't argue, without obvious 
circularity, that I am forbidden to make that choice on the ground that it conflicts with the conjunction 
                                                          
6
 We find the same sort of thing in Leitgeb and Pettigrew (op. cit.): 'assigning a degree of belief 1 to a proposition A 
would mean that the agent believes that A is true rather than false, since the degree of belief 1 is closer – in fact 
identical – to the real number 1 that represents truth than it is to the real number 0 representing falsity' (2010, p.9; 
my emphasis).  
7
 One could even take these end-points as plus and minus infinity. 
8 The remark is aimed at me. Joyce continues: '[that mistake] seems to be the basis of the worries raised in 
Howson (2008, pp. 20–21).' This is not true: here is what I said "it is not clear that it is inaccuracy with respect to 
truth that Joyce’s measure represents, depending as it seems to do on the (purely conventional) use of 1 as the 
numerical proxy for 'true' rather than 0. Indeed, by changing these values round one gets a very different result. A 
perfectly accurate belief function b with respect to [CA] is now only dually probabilistic, with b assigning the value 0 
to a tautology, etc., and Joyce’s proof would show that for any probabilistic belief function there is a non-
probabilistic one strictly less inaccurate than it with respect to all [CA]-valuations. Of course, the definition of 
dominance ... could be transformed correspondingly so that larger numerical discrepancies between b-values and 
[CA]-values correspond to smaller ‘distances’ from the truth, but that would hardly explain the probability axioms 
as taking the form they do."  
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of the Alethic Principle and the condition b() < b(T).  Neither can one appeal without circularity to the 
fact that the probability that A is true is equal to the expected value of IA, since that assumes both that 
truth-values are canonically coded by indicator functions, and that degrees of belief should obey the 
probability axioms, which is what ultimately is to be proved. Nor, again without begging the question, 
can one adduce the fact that it is in my interest, judged by expected utility, to make my degree of belief 
in A equal to my forecast of IA when a proper scoring rule is used to reckon distance from the truth of 
such forecasts: the question is begged, of course, by identifying IA with the truth-value of A.  
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
This is not the place for a detailed assessment of other ways of trying to link the rules of probability to 
some form of truth-directness. Calibration at one time seemed an attractive option, proof against 
Hume's deadly arguments for inductive scepticism, but Joyce himself in (1998) added to the already 
powerful battery of arguments in the literature against it. Unfortunately, if the foregoing is correct, his 
own account fares little better, depending as it does on the Alethic Principle for which there appears to 
be no non-question-begging supporting argument. But without that postulate there is nothing to link 
belief functions with the choice of truth-value coding by indicator functions, and consequently, given the 
symmetry between IA and CA as such codes, nothing to deliver the probability axioms as admissibility 
conditions on truth-accuracy. Together with the apparent failure of the calibration programme, this 
seems to me to raise a large question mark against the claim that the probability axioms have anything 
intrinsically to do with truth-accuracy at all.  
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